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FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TRANSFER FOR TRIAL UNDER
RuLE 2I(b)-Defendant, a Delaware corporation, was indicted in the
Eastern District of Illinois for violations of the Sherman Act. 1 Proceeding
under Rule 2I(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 defendant
moved to transfer the trial to the District of Minnesota, where its principal
business offices were located. The parties stipulated that the alleged offenses
occurred in both Illinois and Minnesota and submitted affidavits, briefs,
and oral argument on the transfer motion to petitioner, the district court
judge. While evaluating numerous other factors relevant to the transfer
motion, the district court gave some weight to the contention of government counsel that impartial jurors would be more difficult to obtain in
Minnesota than in Illinois. The district court denied the motion to transfer. Arguing that the district court's consideration of jury bias in the
transferee district was improper, the defendant sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the transfer. The court of appeals granted the writ and ordered
transfer.8 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed
and remanded to the district court for redetermination of the transfer
motion without reference to possible jury bias in the transferee district.
Appellate supervision by writ of mandamus does not permit a circuit court
to order transfer on the basis of its own findings after review discloses that
one of the factors which led the district court to deny transfer under Rule
2l(b) should not have been considered. Platt v. Minnesota Mining b Mfg.
Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 769 (1964).
The Constitution guarantees federal criminal defendants a trial in the
state where the crime was committed4 before a jury drawn from the district
and state where the offense was committed.5 Thus prosecution for a federal
offense committed in a single district can be initiated only in that district.
Prosecution for a multiple-district federal offense, however, may be brought
in any one of the districts where the crime was committed. 6 A multipledistrict offense-a single crime committed in more than one district-is
frequently involved in a violation of federal antitrust or criminal conSections 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
"The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him
to another district or division, if it appears from the indictment or information or from
a bill of particulars that the offense was committed in more than one district or division
and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should be trans•
£erred to another district or division in which the commission of the offense is charged.''
FED. R. CRIM. P. 2l(b) [hereinafter cited as Rule 2l(b)].
8 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 314 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1963), 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1324 (1963), rev'd by principal case.
4 U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
Ii U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
6 Unless constitutional venue rights are waived, a defendant who commits offense A
in district X and offense B in district Y must be tried in X for offense A and in Y for
offense B if he is to be tried for both offenses. A multiple-district offense, however, is a
single offense committed in both district X and district Y, and trial of the defendant in
either district X or district Y satisfies constitutional venue requirements.
1

2
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spiracy laws.7 Because there was no general provision for transfer of federal
criminal proceedings prior to the adoption of Rule 2l(b),8 the Govern~
ment's choice of the district in which to prosecute for a multiple-district
offense was final and could not be changed by the defendant or the court.9
Defendants charged with multiple-district offenses frequently faced trial in
a district chosen without regard to their convenience or expense.10 The
hardship to defendants, sometimes caused by abusive governmental forum
shopping, led to the promulgation of Rule 21(b) in 1946;11 this provision
gives district judges the power to transfer a criminal proceeding, upon
defendant's motion, to another district or division in which the offense was
committed if transfer would be in the "interest of justice."12
The phrase "interest of justice" implies a broad discretionary power;
thus, numerous authorities state that the propriety of a Rule 2l(b) transfer
is a matter for the district court's discretion,18 and a denial of such a
transfer motion cannot be overturned without proof that the district court
clearly abused that discretion. 14 In practice, district courts give substance to
the abstract standard, "interest of justice," by balancing factors which
7 A corporation may be prosecuted for antitrust violations "not only in the judicial
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found
or transacts business ••••" Clayton Act § 12, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
Venue for conspiracy lies in the district where the agreement was made or in any district
where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed. Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347 (1912); Barber, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A Plea for Return to
Principle, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 39, 42-43 (1963). See generally PROCEEDINGS, N.Y.U. INSTITUTE
ON Fm. R. CRIM. P. 169-70, 274-75 (1946) (comments of Youngquist and Medalie, JJ.);
Freed, The Rules of Criminal Procedure: An Appraisal Based on a Year's Experience, 33
A.B.A.J. 1010, 1012 (1947).
8 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIM. PROC., NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FOR DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED.STATES 21 (1945); Dession, The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure: 11, 56 YALE L.J. 197,224 (1947); Orfield, Transfer of Federal
Offenses Committed in More than One District or Division, 51 MICH. L. REv. 31, 35 (1952).
In the case of a few crimes, statutes did provide for transfer for trial. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3239
(1958).
9 Gates v. United States, 122 F.2d 571, 577 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 698
(1942); U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIM. PROC., op. cit. supra note 8, at 21; Orfield,
Early Federal Criminal Procedure, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 503, 517-18 (1961).
10 United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 548 (D. Neb. 1951); United States v. National
City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 396-97 (S.D. Cal. 1947); PROCEEDINGS, N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON
Fm. R. CRIM. P. 274-75 (1946); Dession, supra note 8, at 224-25; Freed, supra note 7, at
1012.
11 Ibid.
12 Rule 2l(b). Proposed changes to Rule 2l(b) would clarify the disposition to be
made of transfer motions when less than all of the counts charge offenses in the transferee
district. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 665, 680-81 (1962).
18 E.g., Shurin v. United States, 164 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
837 (1948); Kott v. United States, 163 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
837 (1948); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); United States v. Rossiter, 25 F.R.D. 258, 260 (D.P.R. 1960); U.S. ADVISORY COMM.
ON RULES OF CRIM. PROC., op. cit. supra note 8, at 21.
H E.g., United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1960); Shurin v. United
States, supra note 13, at 570; Kott v. United States, supra note 13, at 987.
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support and oppose the requested transfer.111 Practical considerations of
fairness, expediency, and convenience underlie the most frequently cited
factors, which include the location of a corporate defendant's principal
place of business; 16 the place where substantial elements of the alleged
offense occurred; 17 the location of relevant documents and records; 18 the
residence and convenience of witnesses likely to be called; 19 the amount of
increased expense to the parties; 20 the possible disruption of defendant's
business; 21 the location of counsel; 22 docket conditions and opportunity for
speedy trial in the districts involved; 23 and the timeliness of the transfer
motion.24 No authority, however, prescribes an exclusive list of factors beyond
which a court may not inquire when deciding a Rule 2l(b) transfer motion.
Further, the district court's broad discretionary power implies the absence of
hard and fast rules that exclude certain factors from the determination
whether transfer is in the "interest of justice."211 Nonetheless, district court
dispositions of transfer motions are subject to some degree of supervision by
appellate courts.
Whether mandamus is properly used to review the denial of transfer
motions is a somewhat unsettled question. 26 Avoiding discussion of the
mandamus issue, the Supreme Court assumed, purely arguendo, that the
writ would lie in the principal case to compel district court reconsideration
15 See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 154-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 397-98 (S.D. Cal.
1947); United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D. Neb. 1951).
16 E.g., United States v. National City Lines, Inc., supra note 15, at 402; see United
States v. West Coast News Co., 30 F.R.D. 13, 24 (W.D. Mich. 1962); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 194 F. Supp. 754, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17 E.g., United States v. Aronson, 319 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 920
(1963); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
United States v. Van Allen, 28 F.R.D. 329, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
18 E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 194 F. Supp. 754, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. Neb. 1951); United States v. Erie Basin,
Metal Prods. Co., 79 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Md. 1948).
10 E.g., United States v. Foster, 33 F.R.D. 506, 509-10 (D. Md. 1963); United States
v. General Motors Corp., supra note 18, at 756; United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212,
219 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
20 E.g., United States v. Olen, supra note 19, at 219; see United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
21 E.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 20, at 155; United States
v. General Motors Corp., 194 F. Supp. 754, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Olen, 183
F. Supp. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
22 E.g., United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. Neb. 1951); United States v.
National City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
23 E.g., United States v. Warring, 121 F. Supp. 546, 551 (D. Md. 1954); sec United
States v. Erie Basin Metal Prods. Co., 79 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Md. 1948).
24 Shurin v. United States, 164 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837
(1948); United States v. Foster, 33 F.R.D. 506, 509 (D. Md. 1963) (lateness of motion
indicated intent to delay proceedings).
25 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 397 (S.D. Cal. 1947); cf.
United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D. Neb. 1951).
26 Compare United States v. Foster, 296 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1961), with United States
v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1960). Sec Note, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1324, 1326-27
(1963).
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of the proper factors relevant to the requested transfer; this assumption was
occasioned by the fact that the Government had not challenged the circuit
court's position that review by mandamus was proper.27 In addition, the
Government acquiesced in the circuit court's view that the problem of
obtaining impartial jurors in the transferee district was an improper
factor. 28 Concluding, however, that the court of appeals had exceeded the
limits of its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reversed the order to
transfer and held that "the District Court's use of an inappropriate factor
did not empower the Court of Appeals to order the transfer." 29 Rather,
the appropriate criteria should have been selected and left to the district
court to apply on remand. 30 In spite of the saving of judicial energy that
might result if appellate supervisory authority included the power to order
transfer after review by mandamus, the Supreme Court's decision in the
principal case is sound.
Federal courts have power to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 31 Mandamus has traditionally been used at common law and
in federal courts to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is
its duty to act.32 Use of the writ to usurp the discretionary functions of a
lower court, however, is improper.33 An appellate court transfer order after
review by mandamus would deprive the lower court of the discretionary
authority to order transfer which Rule 2l(b) vests in district courts.
Furthermore, the district courts are in the better position to balance the
factors relevant to transfer because they initially receive briefs and affidavits and hear oral argument on the transfer motion. Although review of
the record below may justify an appellate court's finding that denial of
transfer was influenced by an improper factor, the district court still has
the most complete and direct knowledge of the factors affecting the
requested transfer. Thus the district court is still in a better position than
an appellate court to rebalance the opposing interests other than the
improper factor and to decide whether transfer should be granted.
The circuit court decision in the principal case strikingly illustrates
Principal case at 772.
Ibid. Arguably, the Supreme Court should have distinguished between the improper
consideration that an impartial jury could not be selected in Minnesota anq the seemingly
proper consideration that, in obtaining an impartial jury in Minnesota, the Government
would have to spend more time preparing for and conducting examination of prospective
jurors. Although only a minor factor, the increased burden imposed on the Government
might in some instances be relevant in the balancing process which determines whether
transfer would be in the "interest of justice."
20 Principal case at 772.
ao Ibid.
31 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1958).
32 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); Ex parte Republic of Peru,
!118 U.S. 578, 583 (1943); United States v. Hester, 325 F.2d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 1963).
33 See Bankers Life&: Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Johnston v. Marsh, 227
F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1955).
27
28
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both the difficulty of ordering transfer on the basis of a lower court record
and the confusion that appellate court transfer orders may generate. After
determining that an improper factor had been considered,34 the court of
appeals found that the lower court had placed primary emphasis on the
improper factor3 5 and that essential elements of convenience favored
transfer. 36 The court further found transfer consistent with the "fundamental historical right of a defendant to be prosecuted in its own environment or district . . • ."37 Since, however, the district judge had also
considered nine other admittedly appropriate factors before denying the
transfer motion,38 he alone knew what weight had been given to the
improper factor. Thus, the Supreme Court observed, upon remand the
district judge would know how to redetermine the weight of factors
relevant to transfer.39 Furthermore, the circuit court's findings with respect
to the essential elements of convenience flatly contradicted and took no
account of the district court's findings. 40 And the view that criminal
defendants have the historical or constitutional right to trial in their home
district is not only erroneous,41 but also obscures the criteria relevant to
the decision of Rule 2l(b) transfer motions. The court of appeals' language
suggests that, in addition to considering the numerous practical factors
which themselves involve fairness, expediency, and convenience, district
courts must also accord some prior and independent significance to the
fact the defendant seeks transfer to his home district. Giving independent
significance to the fact that defendant seeks transfer to his home district
would disrupt the balancing process which district courts have previously
employed to take into account with fairness the practical factors relevant
to the determination whether a requested transfer under Rule 21(b) would
be in the "interest of justice."42 Finally, it would be unreasonable to
assume that a member of the federal judiciary would refuse to give fair
consideration to the relevant factors upon remand. In the unlikely event
that a district court did refuse to reconsider the decision, or again appraised
34 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 314 F.2d 369, 373-75 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd,
principal case.
35 Id. at 371 n.1. The court of appeals reasoned, unpersuasively, that, because the
improper factor appeared last on the trial court's memorandum of ten factors relevant to
transfer, "we are convinced that he saved the most important item for last." Ibid.
36 Id. at 375 &: n.3.
37 Id. at 375.
38 Principal case at 771-72.
39 Id. at 772.
40 Id. at 771.
41 Id. at 772; see notes 4-12 supra and accompanying text. The location of a defendant's
home district may be relevant when construing venue statutes to determine where
prosecution for a crime may be initiated. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 27!1, 275
(1944); Barber, supra note 7. But in the principal case no question of venue was involved;
the alleged offenses had been committed in both Illinois and Minnesota.
42 "The fact that Minnesota is the main office or 'home' of the respondent has no
independent significance in determining whether transfer to that district would be 'in the
interests of justice,' although it may be considered with reference to such factors as the
convenience of records, officers, personnel and counsel." Principal case at 772.
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improper factors, an appellate court transfer order upon review by
mandamus would seem appropriate if the record clearly demonstrated
that transfer would be in the "interest of justice."43

F. David TTickey

43

Cf. Chicago, R.I. Be P.R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955).

